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NOTES

Hazardous Waste Exportation:
The Global Manifestation of
Environmental Racism
ABSTRACT

During the last decade, the United Nations and other
international organizations have been struggling with the
issue of hazardous waste exportation to developing countries.
At the same time, the United States has been grappling with
environmental racism. However, critics of both hazardous
waste exportation and environmental racism have overlooked
their similarities, namely, that hazardous waste exportation
and environmental racismplace a disproportionateburden on
the same classes of people, the poor and minorities. The
exportation of hazardous waste to developing countries is
essentially environmental racism on an internationalscale.
This Note briefly explains the history and economic
motivations behind hazardous waste exportation and
environmental racism. Several key internationalagreements
and current U.S. policy are analyzed to determine their
effectiveness in reducing the export of hazardous waste to
developing nations. In comparison, studies suggesting a link
between race, income, and the location of hazardous waste
facilities in the United States are outlined, along with current
U.S. policy on environmental racism. The Note concludes that
the similarities between the two problems should enable
opponents of both to join forces to reduce hazardous waste
generation and to advocate the equitable location of
hazardouswastefacilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States government is currently waging a war
against environmental racism in waste siting on both a national
and an international level.
Both Congress and the Clinton
administration have proposed measures that would significantly
restrict or ban the export of hazardous waste to developing
nations. 1
At the same time, Congress and the Clinton
administration
are
developing
proposals
to
end
the
disproportionate siting of hazardous waste facilities in minority

1.
Brad Knickerbockbr, US Joins Global Effort by Curbing Some But Not All
Exports of Waste, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 1994, at 1.
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neighborhoods within the United States. 2 As Greenpeace and
other environmentally conscious organizations have recognized,
hazardous waste exporting to developing countries is simply the
international equivalent of the disproportionate waste siting that
3
occurs in the United States.
A memorandum leaked from the World Bank illustrates the
similarities between domestic and international inequity in waste
siting.4 In February 1992, an internal memorandum written by
Lawrence Summers,5 the vice president and chief economist of
the World Bank, encouraged the export of hazardous waste to
developing nations. 6 In the memorandum, Summers wrote, "I
think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in
the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to
that."7 Summers based his conclusion on a cost-benefit analysis
that valued human life on the basis of future earning potential. 8
Under this analysis, the lower the wage rate in a given nation, the
lower the value of its citizens' lives. Thus, Summers concluded
that "health-impairing pollution should be done in the country
with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest
9
wages."
The World Bank later distanced itself from the memorandum,
stating that Summers meant the statement "ironically," and that
it should not be taken literally. 10 But even if Summers' statement
was an isolated incident of intellectual overreaching and not
World Bank policy, it is still problematic, especially in light of the
World Bank's administration of the Global Environmental Facility

2.
American Bar Association, Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibility, Not In My Backyard, 20 HUM. RIS. 26 (Fall 1993) [hereinafter

NIMBI].
3.
Michael J. Satchell, Deadly Trade in Toxics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 7, 1994, at 65.
4.
The World Bank was created by the United Nations in 1944 for the
specific purpose of providing long-term investment resources for developing
nations to facilitate social and economic growth. The World Bank is the largest
financial institution of its kind and is financed by its 176 member states. World
Bank Group and IM, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Sept. 19, 1993,

availablein LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.

5.

Lawrence Summers, a graduate of the Harvard Business School, is the

vice president of the World Bank, an institution that enjoyed a $1.2 billion
surplus in 1991. Doug Henwood, Toxic Banking; World Bank's Environmental and
Global Policies, 250 NAON 257 (1992).
6.
John Vidal, A Gaffe Over The GEF, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 14, 1992,

at 29.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Henwood, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(GEF).11 The GEF is an international trust fund established in
1991 by the World Bank and the United Nations for the
disbursement of funds to developing nations for environmental
projects. 12 Since 1990, the GEF has grown to over $1.5 billion
and is earmarked to help protect the same nations that Summers
suggests be polluted.13
The struggle facing opponents of
hazardous waste exporting is magnified when the vice president of
the organization meant to protect the environments of developing

nations advocates polluting them.
While Mr. Summers' declarations may be troublesome to
many people, they should not be surprising. In the United States,
hazardous waste is consistently deposited in low-income and
minority neighborhoods. 14
This Note illustrates that
environmental racism occurs domestically and globally:
the
problem of selecting waste sites in the United States is a
microcosm of the international issues raised by hazardous waste
exportation. Part II explains the issues raised by hazardous
waste exporting.
The economic motivation behind the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste is outlined, and the
dangers created by these exports are examined. Part III describes
the major bilateral and multilateral conventions that are intended
to remedy the problems of hazardous waste exporting, as well as
the current U.S. policy regarding these conventions. Part IV
examines the history behind environmental racism in the United
States and the major studies linking the location of hazardous
waste sites with race and income. Current U.S. policy on this
issue is also presented. Finally, Part V explains the microcosmic
relationship
between
hazardous
waste
exporting
and
environmental racism. The Note concludes that the similarities
between these two problems allow opponents of both hazardous
waste exporting and environmental racism to join forces to reduce
the generation of hazardous wastes and to promote the equitable
siting of hazardous waste facilities.

11.
Vidal, supranote 6.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. The GEF has developed into one of the most important tools for
international environmental projects. "GEF is, or looks set to become, the funding
mechanism for the international conventions on ozone, biodiversity and climate
change." Andrew Jordan, Paying the Incremental Costs of Global Environmental
Protections:The Evolving Role of GEF, Global Environment Facility, 36 ENvIr 6, 13
(1994).
14.
Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty, and the Environment,

EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 6, 7.
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II.

THE PROBLEM OF HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTATION

A. The Economic Reality
In the latter half of the twentieth century, hazardous waste' s
generation 1 6 worldwide has increased astronomically. In 1947,
worldwide hazardous waste generation is estimated to have been
only five million metric tons. 1 7 Today, industrialized nations
producing ninety percent of the world's hazardous waste' 8
generate between 300 million and 400 million tons 19 of hazardous
waste annually. 20 Hazardous waste generation in the United
States alone has risen from an estimated nine million metric tons
in 1970 to approximately 247 million metric tons in 1984.21

15.
Throughout this Note, the terms "hazardous waste" and "waste" are
used interchangeably for the sake of brevity. However, in practice, "hazardous
waste" is a subset of "waste" in general. Hazardous wastes include dioxin,
pesticides, heavy metals, and plastics. See infra note 20.
16.
Waste generation is distinct from pollution.
See, e.g., Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (definition of "waste"
distinguishes waste from pollution). While all waste that is generated has the
potential to pollute, waste can and should be disposed in a manner that does not
pollute. One goal of this Note is to call for the safe and proper disposal of
hazardous waste to protect the global environment from pollution.
17.
David P. Hackett, An Assessment of the Basel Convention on the Control

of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 5 AM. U.
J. INT' L. & POLY 291, 294 (1990).
18.
Russell H. Shearer, Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako
Conventions on Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVIL. L. 141, 144 (1993).
19.
In the United States and Canada, hazardous waste is normally
measured in 2000-pound tons. However, due to the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste, organizations also use metric tons to measure waste. A metric
ton is larger than a ton, weighing 2,204 pounds. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICIONARY 733 (10th ed. 1993).
20.
Ninety-eight percent of the world's hazardous wastes are produced by
the twenty-four most industrialized nations.
These wastes include dioxin,
pesticides, heavy metals, and plastics. Cathleen Fogel, Break the Toxic Waste
Habit,CHRISIAN SCI. MONITOR, August 2, 1993, at 19.
21.
Andrew Porterfield & David Weir, The Export of U.S. Toxic Wastes, 245
NATION 325 (1987). Estimates of the amount of hazardous waste generated each
year in the United States vary considerably. The Boston Globe claims that 238
million tons of hazardous waste are produced each year. Mitchell Zuckoff, Waste
Letter May Be Hazardous; Nigerians Outline a Proposalto a Needham Consulting
Firm, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1994, at 23 [hereinafter Waste Letter]. Deeohn
Ferris, Director of the Office for Environmental Justice of the Alliance for
Washington, in her testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, claimed
that the United States generates over 500 million tons of hazardous waste each
year. Environmental Justice: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Environment,
Energy and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
FED. NEWS SERV., March 25, 1994.
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While hazardous
waste
generation
has increased
precipitously, scientists have recognized that many disposal
22
practices pose significant environmental and health problems.
This recognition has resulted in more stringent regulation of
domestic hazardous waste disposal, which, in turn, has increased
23
the cost of disposal and forced the closure of many landfill sites.
In response, generators of hazardous waste have sought
alternatives for the disposal of their waste. 24 Many generators
25
have turned to hazardous waste exporting.
Since 1989, industrialized nations have legally exported an
estimated five million tons of hazardous waste. 2 6 The primary
motivation for exporting this hazardous waste is economic.2 7 As
recently as 1976, the cost of legally disposing of hazardous waste
in the United States was $10 per ton;2 8 today, the cost has risen
to over $2,500 per ton. 29 Nations such as Guinea-Bissau in West
Africa, however, are willing to dispose of hazardous waste for as
little as $40 per ton.3 0
When the cost of lawful disposal
domestically is greater than the cost of disposal abroad, including
transportation costs, hazardous waste producers will choose to

Despite the numerical differences in the estimates, there is a consensus that
the United States is the number one generator of hazardous waste in the world,
generating more hazardous waste each year than all other industrialized nations
combined. See, e.g., Mitchell Zuckoff, A River of Waste From Rich Nations Flows to
the Poor;Foul Trade, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 1994, at 1.
22.
F. James Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of
InternationalLegal Controls, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,171 (Apr. 1989)
[hereinafter Hazardous Waste Exports].
23.
Cristina L. Douglas, Comment, Hazardous Waste Export:
Recommendations for United States Legislation to Ratify the Basel Convention, 38
WAYNE L. REV. 289, 289-90 (1991).
24.
Id. at 290.
25.
Many generators look to neighboring nations for disposal because
neighboring nations may have additional landfill space available or less stringent
environmental regulations. In 1988, for example, eighty-five percent of the
140,000 tons of hazardous waste that the United States legally exported went to
Canada. F. James Handley, Exports of Waste from the United States to Canada:
The How and Why, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,061 (Feb. 1990)
[hereinafter Exports of Waste].
26.
Louis Freedberg, U.S. PlansBan on Export on Toxic Waste, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 26, 1994, at A4.
27.
See generally ALAN A. BLOCK & FRANK R. SCARPrIrl, POISONING FOR

PROFIT: THE MAFIA AND TOXIC WASTE INAMERICA (1984).
28.
Porterfield & Weir, supranote 2 1.
29.
Barbara D. Huntoon, Note, Emerging Controls on Transfers of
HazardousWaste to Developing Countries, 21 LAW & POLY INT'L BUS. 247 (1989).
30.
James Brooke, Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 1988, at Al.
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export their waste.31 "Like water running downhill, hazardous
of along the path of least
wastes invariably will be disposed
32

resistance and least expense."
The financial incentives for accepting hazardous waste from

abroad can be very great for cash-poor, developing nations.

In

1988, for example, the West African nation of Guinea-Bissau
signed a five-year, $600 million contract with a group of European
tanneries and pharmaceutical companies to dispose of fifteen
million tons of toxic waste.33 Under the terms of the contract, the
Europeans would have paid Guinea-Bissau $120 million a year,
an amount equal to eighty percent of the small nation's gross
national product.3 4 The staggering amount of money may have
clouded the judgment of the Guinea-Bissau government regarding
its citizens' best interests. The inherent danger of storing and
disposing of hazardous wastes, even at permitted facilities in the
In communities with
United States, is well documented.3 5
hazardous waste disposal sites, chronic and acute health
problems have been linked with accidental and routine releases of
hazardous waste, which may contaminate the atmosphere, soil, or
groundwater.3 6 Studies have also shown that the presence of
such facilities can depress property values and "hurt domestic,
37
educational and employment stability" in nearby communities.
Finally, residents living near these sites also may suffer
psychological damage because of the constant threat of
environmental disaster.3 8 In developing nations, these dangers
and technology
are multiplied by the lack of skill, knowledge,
39
necessary to handle hazardous waste properly.

31.
Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports, supra note 22. In some areas of
Russia, the price of disposal has reportedly dropped as low as ten rubles, or ten

cents, per ton of hazardous waste. Peter Klebnikov, Russia is Target of Toxic
Dumpingfrom the West, ETHNIC NEWSWATCH, Sept. 19, 1993, at 1.
32.

Porterfield & Weir, supranote 21, at 344 (quoting a statement made in

1983 by Representative James Florio, D-NJ).
33.
Brooke, supranote 30.
34.
Id.
Environmental Justice and Proposed Legislation:T Hearings before the
35.
Subcommr on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, FED. NEWS SERV., Nov. 18, 1993 (testimony of Sharon Carr
Harrington).
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Instead of being properly disposed in developing nations, hazardous
waste is often dumped in remote areas or along roads, which substantially
increases the likelihood of human exposure. Mary Critharis, Note, Third World
Nations Are Down In the Dumps: The Exportation of Hazardous Waste, 16 BROOK.
J. INT'LL. 311,312 (1990).
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The contract between the European companies and Guinea-

Bissau was never enforced because public outrage within GuineaBissau over the agreement forced its government to terminate the
contract. 4
The dilemma facing Guinea-Bissau and similarly
situated developing nations is a difficult one because "[i]t's forcing
41
other countries to choose between poverty and poison."
B. DangersInherent in HazardousWaste Exportation
As the people of Guinea-Bissau realized, exporters and
importers tend to ignore the tremendous external costs, or
externalities, associated with transboundary shipments of
hazardous waste. These costs include: (1) local environmental
and public health dangers; (2) dangers inherent in the
transportation of hazardous waste; and (3) global concerns.
The first of these external costs-local environmental and
public health dangers associated with imported waste-may be so
great as to eliminate all financial benefits from any agreement to
import waste for disposal.42 Environmental and health problems
may be particularly devastating to developing nations because
such nations lack experience with hazardous waste disposal and,
as a result, have few regulatory or technological controls for
handling such waste. Events in the Russian towns of Cheliabinsk
and Orehovo-Zuevo exemplify the potential danger of allowing
inexperienced people to deal with hazardous waste. In 1992, both
towns received several railroad cars filled with cargo labeled
"humanitarian aid. " 43 Unaware of the cargo's toxic qualities, the
44
town of Cheliabinsk tried, unsuccessfully, to bum the waste.
The people of Cheliabinsk4" were horrified to learn that the
railroad cars actually contained seventy tons of toxic cellulose
46
waste, which produces the defoliant dioxin when burned.

40.
Brooke, supranote 30.
41.
Zuckoff, Waste Letter, supra note 21 (quoting Greenpeace Researcher
Connie Murtagh).
42.
Peter Obstier, Toward a Working Solution to Global Pollution: Importing
CERCLA to Regulate the Export of Hazardous Waste, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 73, 79
(1991).
43.
Klebnikov, supranote 31.
44.
Id.
45.
To add insult to injury, the carloads of waste sent to Cheliabinsk were
addressed to the All Russia Center for the Deaf, a sixty-five year old facility with
5,000 patients. Id.
46.
Id.
Dioxins are a group of highly toxic chemicals created when
chlorine is incinerated. In September 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) released a report reassessing the dangers associated with dioxins. The EPA

1995]

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM

Tragically, the town of Orehovo-Zuevo learned this lesson when
its residents suffered dioxin poisoning and the attendant
uncontrollable vomiting. 4 7 Ultimately, the costs of dealing with
such local environmental and public health problems fall entirely
on the people of the importing nation.
A second external cost associated with hazardous waste
exporting stems from the dangers inherent in
waste
transportation itself. Transporters have a diminished incentive to
avoid accidents resulting from transboundary, hazardous waste
shipments, in part, because most countries' liability regulations
are weak or unenforceable once the waste has left its country of
origin.4 8 For example, at the present time, liability under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)49 for United States generators does not
apply extraterritorially.5 0
Without the prospect of liability,
generators and transporters are more likely to be careless and,
therefore, to have accidents.5 1
Another reason for careless
transportation is that hazardous waste has a negative value for
the generator.5 2 The typical incentives for protecting cargo do not
exist, and the transporter is more apt to damage or lose part of
the cargo during transit.5 3 One well-publicized example of "lost"
cargo is the barge Khian Sea, which spent two years at sea trying
to find a place to dump its load of toxic incinerator ash originating
from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. S 4
Before the Haitian
government agreed to take the ash in 1988, most of the toxic
cargo had vanished, most likely in the Indian Ocean.5 5 Because
CERCLA did not apply in this situation, the crew of the Khdan Sea

determined that dioxins are more dangerous than previously understood and can
cause birth defects, reproductive disorders, and cancer at any level of exposure.
Ken Ward, Jr., APCO May Make $3 Million in Pulp Mill Land Sale, CHARLESTON
GAZET, Feb. 7, 1995, at ID.
47.
Klebnikov, supranote 3 1.
48.
Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports, supranote 22, at 10,175.
49.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA or Superfund].
See generally BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN Er AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT.
REDUCINGTHE RISK (overview of CERCLA statute).
50.
Cf. Obstler, supra note 42, at 103 (arguing for the extraterritorial
application of CERCLA as a solution to hazardous waste exporting).
51.
See Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports, supranote 22, at 10,175.
52.
Id. at 10,175 n.27.
53.
Id.
54.
Jon Sawyer, Haiti Seeks Removal of U.S. Waste, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, May 12, 1991, at 1A.
55.
Id.
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was not punished.5 6 The global environment and, in particular,
nations along hazardous waste transport routes eventually bear
the cost of such carelessness.
If hazardous waste is spilled during transportation or is
improperly disposed, the waste could return to the generator
nation not in fifty-five gallon drums, but in its food supply. This
boomerang effect s 7 may occur, for example, when a United States
municipality ships its sewage sludge to the Caribbean for use as
fertilizer on crops.5 8 This sludge, which is a solid by-product of
municipal waste disposal systems, often contains heavy metals
59
and pesticides that may infiltrate a plant's root systems.
Because the United States imports large quantities of food from
the Caribbean and the Food and Drug Administration has the
capacity to inspect only small amounts of these shipments,
tainted food could possibly reach U.S. consumers. 60 This "circle
of poison" affects the exporting industrial nation as well as the
61
importing developing nation.
Finally, the transboundary movement of hazardous waste to

developing nations implicates enormous global concerns.

Given

developing nations inexperience in handling hazardous waste and
the large quantities of such waste generated each year, 6 2 the
possibility of a major international environmental disaster
exists. 63 Although these disasters did not occur during the
transport of hazardous waste, the 1984 Union Carbide disaster in
65
Bhopal, India, 6 4 and the 1986 nuclear accident in Chernoby1

56.
See generally Edith B. Weiss, International Environmental Law:
ContemporaryIssues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675
(1993) (general discussion of treaties relating to oceans and seas).
57.
Jerry Alder, PesticideProtection,NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1987, at 71.
58.
This scenario was presented by Wendy Greider, an official in the EPA's
Office of International Activities. Porterfield & Weir, supranote 21, at 343.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 374 (1988) (testimony of Bonnie Ram,
Bernard Schwartz Fellow in Energy and Environment, Federation of American
Scientists).
62.
The United States, for example, generated approximately 271 million
tons of hazardous waste in 1990. Grant L. Katz, Note, Implementing the Basel
Convention into U.S. Law: Will it Help or HinderRecycling Efforts?, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB.
L. 323 (1992).

63.
Obstler, supranote 42, at 79.
64.
In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d
Cir. 1987).
65.
Alex Strachan, Couple Seeks Holiday for Children of Chernobyl,
VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 31, 1994, at B12.
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highlight the potential magnitude for an international disaster
involving hazardous materials. In Bhopal, a toxic gas leak from a
pesticide manufacturing plant owned by Union Carbide killed as
many as 10,000 people and injured over 200,000.66

At the

Chernobyl nuclear power plant near Kiev in the Ukraine, a fire
and explosion shredded a nuclear reactor, filling the skies with
The longradioactive isotopes and killing forty-two people. 6 7
term effects of the radioactive emissions from the reactor at
Chernobyl have been more difficult to quantify than those from
Bhopal, but they are equally frightening considering that the
68
emissions spread to other European nations.
Both accidents illustrate the transnational nature of
The Bhopal tragedy revealed the
environmental disasters.
environmental risks of certain transnational enterprises, while
the Chernobyl disaster illustrated the potential risk of
The transboundary
transnational environmental damage.
movement of hazardous waste presents both types of
transnational risks. In either situation, the costs of remedying
environmental damage or ensuring that appropriate preventive
measures are taken should be borne not only by the importing
nation, but also by its neighbors.
III. REMEDIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTATION

Transboundary movement of waste clearly affects more than
The export of hazardous waste to
just importing nations.
developing nations exposes the importing nation, its neighbors,
every nation along the transportation route, and all nations with
which the importing nation trades agricultural products to the
dangers of mishandled hazardous waste. Since the mid-1980s,
the international community has come to realize the global
importance of this issue and has joined together to form a variety
of multinational solutions to this problem. However, beginning

66.

Union Carbide,809 F.2d at 197.
As a result of the explosion and radioactive release, an eighteen-mile
67.
.zone of estrangement" has been set around the Chernobyl plant, prohibiting
former residents from returning to their villages, which have been compJetely
buried to help control the radioactive contamination. Susan Benkelman, Dealing
with Chernobyl; 8 Years After the Accident, Big Potential Risks Remain, NEWSDAY,

Nov. 21, 1994, atA6.

68.

Strachan, supranote 65 (estimating that 600,000 people were affected

by radioactive emissions from the Chernobyl accident in 1986).
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with the Basel Convention in 198969 and continuing through the
Rio Declaration in 1992,70 the multitude of opinions has failed to
coalesce into a single, dominant solution for the externalities of
hazardous waste exporting, which continue to be a vexing
problem.
A. The Basel Convention

1. The Final Act of the Basel Convention
The first major agreement addressing the problem of
hazardous waste exportation was the 1989 Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal (Basel Convention). Sponsored by the United
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP),7 1 the Basel
Convention was the result of nearly a decade of work by members
of the United Nations to create a binding global treaty on the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. 72 The challenge
of the Basel Convention was reconciling the interests of the
developing nations, which sought tight restrictions on hazardous
waste exporting, with the interests of the industrialized nations,
which wanted exporting to remain a viable alternative for
hazardous waste disposal. 73 The resulting convention has been
described as "a compromise treaty that is long on rhetoric and
short on substance and effectiveness." 74 Although most of the
116 representatives to the United Nations initially refused to sign
the treaty in 1989, 75 a sufficient number of nations have
subsequently ratified the Convention so that it formally entered
into force on May 5, 1992, three years after the First Conference

69.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, opened for signatureMar. 22, 1989, UNEP
Doc. IG.80/3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention].
70.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted June 14,
1992, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/5/Rev.1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
71.
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was established
in 1972 by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm to encourage the international exchange of ideas regarding the
development of solutions to global environmental problems. Douglas, supra note
23, at 293.
72.
Obstler, supranote 42, at 94.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Huntoon, supranote 29, at 261.
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of the Parties ended. 76

263

Despite its inauspicious beginning, the

Basel Convention remains the broadest and most significant
77

international treaty on hazardous waste presently in effect.
A central concern of the Basel Convention is the overall
reduction of hazardous waste generation. 78 The Convention's
primary means of reducing waste generation is to increase the
cost of hazardous waste exportation, thereby forcing industries to
reduce their waste generation rather than continuing to ship it
abroad. 7 9 Article 4 of the Convention attempts to accomplish this
goal by preventing toxic shipments in five situations.
First, Article 4 requires both importing and exporting parties
to block the movement of specified types of waste that the
importing state does not want.8 0 Recognizing the sovereignty of
each member state, the Convention permits the importing state 8to1
decide which wastes will be blocked under this scheme.
Second, for wastes not specifically prohibited by the importing
state, both importing and exporting parties must prevent any
waste shipment to which the importing state has not formally
consented in writing.8 2 This procedure is known as the "notice
Third, the Convention requires
and consent" requirement.8 3
exporters to prohibit any waste shipment, particularly to a
developing state, if the exporter "has reason to believe that the
wastes in question will not be managed in an environmentally

76.

The Basel Convention enters into force ninety days after twenty

nations ratify it. Basel Convention, supra note 70, art. 25(1). By April 28, 1992,
twenty-two nations had ratified the Basel Convention: Argentina, Australia,
China, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Finland, France, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia,

Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and Uruguay. Because obtaining the requisite
twenty ratifying nations took three years, many viewed the Convention not so

much as entering into force as "limping in." United Nations Officials See Basel
Treaty as 'Limping" Into Effect with Limited Support, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (May
22, 1992) [hereinafter "Limping"Into Effect].
Obstler, supra note 42, at 94.
77.

The preamble to the Basel Convention states, in part, "that the most
78.
effective way of protecting human health and the environment from the dangers
posed by such wastes is the reduction of their generation to a minimum in terms
of quantity and/or hazard potential." The preamble also recognizes "[t]he need to

continue the development and implementation of environmentally sound lowwaste technologies,

recycling options, good housekeeping and management

systems with a view to reducing to a minimum the generation of hazardous
wastes and other wastes." Basel Convention, supra note 69, pmbl.
Katz, supranote 62, at 327.
79.
80.

Basel Convention, supra note 69, arts. 4(1)(a)-(b).

81.

Id. art. 4(1)(a).
Id. art. 4(l)(c).
Douglas, supranote 23, at 299.

82.
83.
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sound manner."8 4 Fourth, all parties to the Convention must
prevent the shipment of any waste, hazardous or non-hazardous,
meant for disposal in Antarctica. 85
Finally, all parties must
prohibit the import and/or export of any waste, hazardous or
non-hazardous, involving a non-party state.8 6 The purpose of
this last prohibition is to lock out, or exclude, non-ratifying
states, such as the United States, 8 7 from all legal, hazardous
waste trade with states parties to the Convention. This last
prohibition may be set aside only if a separate international
agreement, meeting the Basel Convention standard of
"environmentally sound management," exists between the
member and non-member states.8 8 A violation of any of these
prohibitions automatically requires the exporting state to recover
its shipment from the importing state.8 9
The notice and consent provision and the lock-out provision
are particularly important to the Basel Convention. The notice
and consent provision requires the exporter to give written notice
of its intent to ship hazardous waste to the importing nation, the
exporting nation (if applicable), and all nations through which the
waste is transported. 90 Within sixty days after an exporter has
given such notice, the notified parties may respond in writing to
reject the shipment, accept it with or without conditions, or
request more information. 9 1 The exporting nation must prevent
any shipment before receiving written notification of the importing
nation's consent and proof of a contract to dispose of the waste in
an environmentally sound manner. 9 2 The notice and consent
provisions promote the exchange of information, allowing all
affected nations to make informed and intelligent decisions about

84.
Id. art. 4(2)(e). The terms "reason to believe" and "environmentally
sound manner" have come under fire from some commentators as being too
broad and open to interpretation. Huntoon, supranote 29, at 264.
85.

Basel Convention, supra note 69, art. 4(6).

86.
87.

Id. art. 4(5).
At the time of publication of this Note, the United States had not

enacted the necessary legislation required to ratify the treaty. It is estimated that
Congress will not attempt to implement the necessary legislation until 1996
because of the need to educate the new members of the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation about the complex issues relating to
the Basel Convention. U.S. Failure to Ratify Basel Treaty Seen as Environmental
Justice Issue, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Oct. 26, 1994).
88.
Basel Convention, supranote 69, art. 11(1).
89.
Obstler, supranote 42, at 96.
90.
Basel Convention, supranote 69, art. 6(1).
91.
Id. arts. 6(2), 6(4).
92.
Id. arts. 6(3)(a)-(b).
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the movement of hazardous waste across their borders. 93 These
provisions also create a "paper trail" that increases the
94
accountability of the parties involved.
The lock-out provision provides a compelling incentive for all
United Nations member states to ratify the Basel Convention. If a
state fails to ratify the treaty, it may not engage in hazardous
waste trade with states that have ratified the Convention. 95 The
threat of being locked out of trade with certain regions of the
world provides an incentive to become a party to the Convention.
This threat is significant because seventy-six states have chosen
96
to ratify the Convention.
Under certain circumstances, however, the lock-out provision
For
may discourage ratification of the Basel Convention.
instance, by refusing to join the treaty-claiming that it does not
protect developing states sufficiently-the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) states 97 effectively banned all hazardous waste
imports from states that ratified the Basel Convention. 98 Thus,
nations contemplating ratification were locked out of the
hazardous waste trade with some potential recipients of waste,
regardless of whether they ratified the Convention. 9 9 If these
nations ratified the Basel Convention, they would have been
locked out of trade with OAU nations under Article 4, Section 5 of
the Convention. 1°0 If these same nations failed to ratify it, they
themselves would have been excluded from trade with parties to
the Basel Convention under the same provision.10 1 This Catch-22
mechanism has impeded further movement towards ratification
and, in turn, has limited the effectiveness of the Basel
Convention. o2

93.

David J. Abrams, Note, Regulating the InternationalHazardous Waste

Trade: A ProposedGlobal Solution, 28 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 825 (1990).

94.
Id. Because the status of hazardous wastes can be more effectively
monitored as a result of the paperwork required by the notice and consent
provision, the accountability of the parties involved in the transboundary
movement of waste is increased.
95.
Basel Convention, supranote 69, art. 4(5).
Signatories to Basel Pollution Pact to Meet With Industry on
96.
Implementation, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 248 d14 (Dec. 30, 1994)
[hereinafter SignatoriesMeet With Industry].
97.
Fifty-three African states are members of the Organization of African
Unity. South Africa: InternationalLaw Provisions of the 1993 Constitution, 33
I.L.M. 1043 (1994).
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100. Basel Convention, supranote 69, art. 4(5).
101.
Id.

102. A major concern at the time the Basel Convention came into force was
the lack of large industrialized nations as parties. Twenty-one nations initially
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Second Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention

On March 25, 1994, signatory states to the Basel Convention
met in Geneva, Switzerland, at the Second Conference of the
Parties. At this meeting, the parties reached a decision that may
develop into a sixth situation under which the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste may be banned.1 0 3 The seventy-six
member states agreed to a total ban on hazardous waste exports
from nations belonging to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation
and Development
(OECD)1° 4
to
non-OECD
05
nations.,
This decision marks a significant departure from the original
goal of the Basel Convention, namely, making hazardous waste
exportation less appealing economically, rather than prohibiting
the trade outright. 1 6 Nevertheless, a ban on hazardous waste
exports from OECD nations to non-OECD nations effectively
would eliminate all hazardous waste exporting to less developed
nations, further promoting the goal of the Basel Convention.
Although some commentators have labelled the March 25 decision
"a
striking victory for global environmental justice,"1° 7
international industry and the United States have been less
enthusiastic about the decision. As a result of the March 25
decision, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has withdrawn its
support of the Basel. Convention, and the Clinton administration
08
has slowed its ratification efforts.
Unlike the first five prohibitions of the Basel Convention, the
prohibition contained in the March 25 decision is not legally

ratified the Convention. Conspicuous by their absence were the United States,
Canada, and eleven of the twelve European Community states at that time (all
except France). "Lirnping"IntoEffect, supranote 76.
103.
OECD Hazwaste Export Ban by 1998, HAZNEWS, May 1994, at 74
[hereinafter Export Ban].

104. The OECD was organized to help coordinate the trade policies of its
member states. It is comprised of the world's twenty-five most industrialized

nations and Mexico. DOJ Hits Borden Chemicals with Charges of RCRA, Right-toKnow, AirAct Violations, Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 31, 1994).
105. The ban proposes to operate in two phases. In the first phase, all
hazardous waste exports from OECD states for final disposal in non-OECD states

have been immediately banned. Exports to non-OECD states for recycling are
permitted until Dec. 31, 1997, when phase two begins and prohibits them. Until

1998, non-OECD states must notify the Basel Secretariat of any recycling imports
from OECD states. SignatoriesMeet With Industry, supranote 96.
106. Katz, supra note 62, at 327.
107. Export Ban, supranote 103.
108. 'Wait-and-See" May Become U.S. Policy on Recent Export Ban Under
Basel Treaty, Intl Env't Daily (BNA) (June 21, 1994) [hereinafter "Wait-and-See"].
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binding because it was made separately, after the final act of the
Convention.1°9
Nevertheless,
the international pressure
associated with the decision will make hazardous waste exports to
non-OECD nations "taboo."1 10
Industry representatives and
Basel Convention signatories are scheduled to meet in Dakar,
Senegal, on March 13-15, 1995, to discuss potential modifications
of the March 25 decision.1 1 1 The results of these discussions will
be forwarded to the Third Conference of the Parties to the Basel
Convention, scheduled for September 1995 in Madrid, Spain.112
B. The Lome IV Convention
As many developing nations began to realize that the Basel
Convention would fail to protect their interests adequately, some
of these nations decided to form their own multilateral treaties
banning the importation of hazardous waste into their territory.
113
In 1990, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states (ACP states)
and the European Economic Community (EEC)1 14 signed the
Lome IV Convention." 5
The Lome IV Convention bans all
hazardous waste exports from EEC states to ACP states 1 16 and
prohibits ACP states from accepting hazardous waste imports
from any other nations.1 1 7 According to one commentator, these
two requirements make the Lome IV Convention the "most
sweeping international ban on the hazardous waste trade to

date."118
Some commentators viewed this outright ban of exports from
the EEC to ACP states as an indication that industrialized nations
were beginning to distinguish hazardous waste exports to

109.
Id. The fact that the decision was made after the final act of the
Convention has caused the United States to complain about the manner in which
the decision was made. Id.
110.
Id.
111.
SignatoriesMeet With Industry, supranote 96.
112. Id.
113. The ACP states are the sixty-eight former European colonies found in
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Abrams, supranote 93, at 840.
114. At the time of the signing of the Lome IV Convention, there were twelve
states in the European Economic Community:
Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
and the United Kingdom. Fact Sheet: European Community, 3 DEP'r ST. DISPATCH
51 (1992).
115. The Fourth African, Caribbean, and Pacific States-European Economic
Community Convention of Lome, opened for signatureMarch 22, 1990, 29 I.L.M.
783 (1990) [hereinafter Lome IV Convention].
116. Id. art. 39(l).
117.
Id.
118. Abrams, supranote 93, at 840.
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developing nations from those to industrialized nations. 1 19 The
position of the Lome IV Convention suggests a departure from the

stance taken by many industrialized nations at the Basel
Convention's First Conference of the Parties. Disagreement over
the appropriate extent of the ban on hazardous waste delayed the
implementation of the Basel Convention until May 5, 1992.120 In
contrast, under the Lome IV Convention, the complete ban of
hazardous waste exports to ACP states became effective
immediately, notwithstanding the fact that the rest of the
Convention had yet to take effect. 121
The revolutionary aspect of the Lome IV Convention is its
12 2
complete ban on hazardous waste exports to ACP states,
regardless of whether the waste originates in EC member
states. 123 African nations were some of the earliest victims of the
hazardous waste trade and also the first to fight back against
toxic terrorism. 12 4 The importance of hazardous waste exporting
to African nations is illustrated by the fact that in 1988, the
Nigerian government threatened hazardous waste importers with

119.

See id.

120.
The fact that all thirty-nine of the African nations at the Basel
Convention refused to sign the treaty made its ratification by the requisite twenty
nations more difficult to attain and delayed the Basel Convention from entering
into force. Huntoon, supranote 29, at 261.
121.
The rest of the Lome IV Convention was a ten-year trade and aid pact
between the EC and the ACP states. The ban on hazardous waste exporting was
made effective immediately because the parties to the Convention recognized that
several months would pass before the entire treaty could officially enter into force.
Under the Lome IV Convention, the treaty had to be ratified by the parliaments of
all twelve EC states at the time and by two-thirds of the ACP states. EC Bans
Dangerous Waste Exports to Third World, Reuters, Mar. 22, 1990, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Given that the Convention did not officially
enter into force until September 1991, the parties to the Convention correctly
assumed that its ratification would take months. Address by Mr. Manuel Marin at
the Joint ACP/CEAssembly-Amsterdam 24 Sept. 1991, RAPID, Sept. 24, 1991.
122. Some European Community officials wondered if a complete ban on
hazardous waste exports to ACP states under the Lome IV Convention ran
counter to the international free trading rules set forth in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks. Environment: EC Dispute over Toxic Waste
Exports to Third World, Inter Press Service, Dec. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US File.
123. Lome IV Convention, supra note 115, art. 39(1).
124. Brooke, supra note 30. In speaking out against hazardous waste
exports, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya called these acts of the industrialized
nations "garbage imperialism." The Minister of Environment of the Republic of
Mali, Morifing Kone, called the exports "morally reprehensive and criminal actis]."
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND MACHINERY UNIT, HAZARDOUS WASTE: WHY AFRICA MUST
ACT NOW 1-3 (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter ELMU Article].
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death by firing squad. 125 When the industrialized states refused
to agree to a total ban on hazardous waste exporting, the African
states recognized that they would have to take the initiative to
protect themselves. The leaders of African states, in particular,
have continued to stress
the importance of banning all imports of
1 26
wastes.
hazardous
C. The Bamako Convention
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) believed that the
Basel Convention failed to protect adequately the continent of
Africa, citing the treaty's lack of a complete ban on the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste. 127 In addition, the
OAU believed that Basel Convention guidelines could be evaded
too easily because no effective system existed for the

administration of the treaty. 128 Out of these concerns developed
the Bamako Convention, 12 9 which bans all imports of hazardous
waste into Africa and restricts the movement of waste already in
130
Africa.
Although both the Bamako and Lome IV Conventions protect
African states, these conventions are distinguishable. One of the
primary distinctions between the Bamako Convention and the
Lome IV Convention lies in the composition of the signatories of
each agreement-members of the OAU and the ACP states,
respectively. Whereas political history determines membership in
the ACP states, OAU membership is defined exclusively in terms
of geography. The ACP states, while including African nations,
extend membership to all former European colonies, including
Caribbean and Pacific Island nations. All ACP states do not
necessarily share the same environmental concerns because their

125.

After learning that hazardous wastes from Italy had been dumped in a

Nigerian port, Duro Onabule, a spokesman for the government, threatened the

importers with a firing squad and declared, 'There will be no mercy on this issue."
Phillip Shabecoff, Irate and Afraid, Poor Nations Fight Efforts to Use Them as Toxic
Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1988, at C4.
126. Only Africa and Central America have banned all hazardous waste

imports to their respective regions. Fogel, supranote 20, at 19.
127.

Shearer, supranote 18, at 151.

128. Id.
129. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, opened for signature Jan. 29,

[hereinafter Bamako Convention].
130. Shearer, supra note 18, at 143.

1991,

30 I.L.M.

773 (1991)
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geography and location vary dramatically. 13 1 The conflicting
interests of the ACP states limited the scope and the specificity of
the Lome IV Convention. Membership in the OAU, on the other
hand, is limited solely by the geographic boundaries of the African
continent.
All OAU member states, therefore, have similar
environmental concerns, allowing the Bamako Convention to

address a broader range of issues as well as more specific
environmental issues and threats.
Thus, the Bamako
Convention, while sharing the Lome IV policy goal of protecting
African nations, is both broader and more specific than the Lome
IV Convention.
As previously discussed, the Bamako Convention was
designed to provide greater protection to African states than the
Basel Convention. Although the preambles to both the Basel and

Bamako Conventions are similar, 13 2 several important differences
between the two agreements make the Bamako Convention
broader. 133 First and most importantly, the Bamako Convention
completely bans all hazardous waste imports into Africa, 13 4

including the importation of waste for use in recycling,

35

a

136

Article 2 of
frequently used loophole in the Basel Convention.
the Bamako Convention defines hazardous waste more broadly
than the Basel Convention, thereby allowing the regulation of

131.
For example, Pacific Island states may be particularly concerned with
ocean dumping, whereas interior African states may be more concerned with soil
and groundwater contamination. See id. at 146-47.
132. "Both conventions call for a reduction of quantity and hazard potential
of wastes generated, place responsibility for the disposal and consequences
thereof upon the generator, preserve the sovereignty of states to completely ban
the import of wastes, call for the disposal of wastes at the locus of generation
where environmentally sound, call for the use of clean technologies and sound
waste management practices, call for the eventual elimination of hazardous
waste, and call for the safe transportation of waste where such transportation is
necessary." Shearer, supranote 18, at 153.
133. Id.
134. Bamako Convention, supranote 129, art. 4(1).
135.
See id.
136.
See, e.g., Environment: North's Toxic Exports To The South Continue To
Rise, Inter Press Service, May 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US
File ("Direct waste dumping is taking place in the name of recycling.") [hereinafter
North's Toxic Exports]; Greenpeace: CallFor Ban On All Waste Exports, EUR. ENVr,
June 2, 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File (1,500 metric tons of

pesticides, such as DDT and dioxin, exported for reuse from Germany to
Romania, found abandoned and open, near drinking water); Euro-MPS Slam EC
Waste Exports to Third World, Reuter Library Reports, Mar. 12, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File (Egyptians reject German shipment of battery
casings to be "recycled" by fire, which would have produced dioxin).
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more types of wastes.13 7 The Bamako Convention also creates a
limited ban on the transfer of hazardous waste within and among
the African nations. 138 Taken together, these provisions allow
hazardous waste to be exported from and transferred among
39
African nations, but prohibit all imports from outside the OAU. 1
Second, in response to fears that the administrative
framework of the Basel Convention is ineffective, Article 5 of the
Bamako Convention requires each member state to designate
competent authorities, a focal point, and a dumpwatch. 14 0 The
focal point is an attempt to centralize each member state's
administration of the treaty. The competent authorities are the
contact people charged with handling the necessary
administrative work. 14 1 The dumpwatch is not clearly defined in
the treaty; 14 2 however, its apparent purpose is to monitor the
dumping of hazardous waste. 14 3 Although both Conventions
require competent authorities and a focal point to be designated
by member states, 144 the Basel Convention lacks the additional
monitoring system created by the dumpwatch in the Bamako
Convention.
Third, Article 4 of the Bamako Convention specifically
prohibits the dumping of hazardous waste at sea or in internal
waters, a prohibition conspicuously absent from the Basel
Convention. 145 This provision is designed to prevent incidents
such as that of the Khdan Sea, in which most of a load of
hazardous waste was "lost" in the Indian Ocean. 146 Dumping in

137.
The Bamako Convention also includes the regulation of radioactive
wastes, which the Basel Convention failed to include directly. Shearer, supra

note 18, at 155.
138. Id. at 163.
139. Bamako Convention, supra note 129, arts. 4(l), (3)(n)(i)-(ii).
140. Article 5 provides, in part, "Parties shall... appoint a national body to
act as a Dumpwatch. In such capacity as a Dumpwatch, the designated national
body only will be required to co-ordinate with the concerned governmental and
non-governmental bodies." Id. art. 5(4).
141. The focal point is the central authority for each member state
administer the treaty. Certain reporting and administrative responsibilities are
delegated to the competent authorities. Mr. Shearer compares the focal point to
the Washington, D.C. office of the United States EPA and the competent
authorities to the regional offices of the EPA. Shearer, supra note 18, at 167

n.164.
142.

See generally Brooke, supra note 30.

143. Compare Basel Convention, supra note 69, art. 5 with Bamako
Convention, supranote 129, art. 5.
144. Bamako Convention, supranote 129, art. 4(2).
145. Id.
146. See Sawyer, supra note 54, at 1A. See also text accompanying supra
notes 54-56.
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international waters has also been addressed explicitly in other
treaties.

147

Fourth, the Bamako Convention applies unlimited joint and
148
several liability on the generators of improperly disposed waste.
The unlimited liability provision allows for the imposition of
whatever damages are deemed appropriate by the trier of fact,
including punitive damages.1 4 9 The Basel Convention, on the
other hand, because of the conflicting interests of its
industrialized and developing signatory nations, does not
incorporate the requisite mechanisms for applying liability against
15 0
the generators of hazardous waste.

Fifth, the Bamako Convention mandates extremely high
standards for the prevention of pollution. The Bamako standards

are much more stringent than those found in the Basel
The Bamako Convention requires the
Convention.151
"preventative, precautionary approach to pollution problems "15 2
and explicitly rejects the less stringent "permissible emissions
approach." 1ss The preventative, precautionary approach prohibits
the release of potentially harmful substances even without
scientific evidence of harm, whereas the permissible emissions
standard allows the release of any toxic waste until its designated
threshold is reached. 1s 4 In contrast, the Basel Convention only
requires hazardous waste generation levels to be reduced in light

147. See generally Weiss, supranote 56. Among the treaties discussed are:
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120; Barcelona
Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16,
1976, 15 I.L.M. 290; Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific
Region by Dumping, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 65 (entered into force Aug. 22,
1990); and the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 11,085,
22 I.L.M. 227 (entered into force Oct. 11, 1986).
148. Bamako Convention, supranote 129, art. 4(3)(b).
149.
See Shearer, supranote 18, at 158.
150. Obstler, supra note 42, at 96-97.
151.
See Shearer, supra note 18, at 160-62.
152. Bamako Convention, supranote 129, art. 4(3)(f).
153. The "permissible emission approach" is based on the concept that the
environment can effectively absorb toxins up to a threshold, above which the
environment can no longer assimilate the toxins. J. GORDON ARBUCKLE El AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 4-5 (11th ed. 1991). Under this approach, a
threshold level is determined, and polluters are allowed to pollute as much as
This approach establishes a
they want until the threshold is reached.
significantly less stringent standard than the "preventative, precautionary
approach," which maintains that no amount of pollution is acceptable. Id.
154.
See id.

19951

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM

273

of social, technological, and economic factors. 155 Therefore, the
Basel standards are less stringent because they do not require
pollution prevention technology that may exceed a nation's
1
technological or economic abilities.
The Bamako Convention's broad scope and high standards
ultimately may limit the economic development of African nations.
Specifically, the broad definition of hazardous waste, which closes
the perceived loophole for recycling materials, limits African
nations to the use of those materials already found on the
continent,1 5 7
thereby inhibiting industrial growth in Africa.
Similarly, the ambitious "preventative, precautionary approach" to
preventing pollution may also stunt industrial growth in Africa
because it permits the imposition of emissions limitations before
scientific evidence has established the likelihood of harm. These
restrictions will increase business costs in Africa and discourage
industries from locating there. 158 Nevertheless, the OAU appears
to have made the conscious decision to protect its nations from
hazardous waste even at the expense of diminished industrial
growth.
D. The Rio Declaration
In June 1992, the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development brought 178 nations together in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to discuss the future of international
environmental law. 159 The result was the Rio Declaration, a
legally nonbinding statement of principles concerning the global
environment and development. 160
The scope of the Rio
Declaration is extremely broad, recognizing each nation's duty to
"protect the integrity of the global environment," 16 1 and to provide
priority treatment to "the special situation and needs of
developing countries, particularly the least developed and those

155. Basel Convention, supranote 69, art. 4(2)(a).
156.
Shearer, supra note 18, at 162. Mr. Shearer argues that the Bamako
Convention's "preventative, precautionary approach" may be too burdensome for
states belonging to the OAU because its member states do not have access to the
same resources available to more developed states. If businesses and industries
in the OAU cannot afford the technology required by the "preventative,
precautionary approach," this provision will not be enforceable. Id. at 167-76.
157.
Shearer, supranote 18, at 175.
158.
Id.at 176.
159. Weiss, supra note 56, at 707.
160.
Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, After Rio, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28,
1992, at 3.
161.
Rio Declaration, supranote 70, pmbl.
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most environmentally vulnerable."1 6 2
Although the Rio
Declaration is not legally binding, it is significant because it
represents

the

views

of a

large

majority

of the

world's

countries. 16
Importantly, the Rio Declaration proclaims that the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste should be
discouraged. 1 64
Principle 14 of the Declaration calls for a
collective effort by member states of the United Nations to prevent
the movement of materials harmful to the environment and/or
humans. 165 Principle 19 sets up a prior notice system between
states, similar to the notice and consent provision found in the
Basel Convention. 16 6 These principles, combined with the special
priority given to developing nations, demonstrate a movement
away from the hard line that industrialized nations took in the
Basel Convention toward a view that developing nations must be
protected from hazardous waste exports. Though non-binding and
intentionally non-specific, the Rio Declaration promises to add
another piece to the continually developing body of international
environmental law and to aid in the development of a more
effective global environmental policy. 167
E. Current United States Policy
On February 28, 1994, the Clinton administration proposed a
ban on the export of hazardous waste from the United States,
particularly on transfers to developing nations.1 68 Although the

United States exports only a very small fraction of the hazardous
waste it generates, 16 9 with most of that waste ending up in

162.
163.

Id. princ. 6.
See id.

164.
North's Toxic Exports, supra note 136.
165.
Principle 14 provides: "States should effectively cooperate to
discourage or prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of any activities
and substances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be
harmful to human health." Rio Declaration, supranote 70, princ. 14.
166.
Principle 19 reads: "States shall provide prior and timely notification
and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that may have
a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with
those States at an early stage and in good faith." Id. princ. 19. Article 4(1)(c) of
the Basel Convention states: "Parties shall prohibit or shall not permit the export
of hazardous wastes and other wastes if the State of import does not consent in
writing to the specific import...." Basel Convention, supranote 69, art. 4(1)(c).
167.
Kass & Gerrard, supra note 160, at 3.
168.
Freedberg, supra note 26, at A4.
169.
In 1992, 145,000 tons of hazardous wastes were exported from the
United States. Vicki Allen, Clinton Seeks Ban on Most Hazardous Waste Exports,
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Canada and Mexico, 170 the proposed ban represents a dramatic
step toward protecting developing nations from hazardous waste.
If the United States enacted legislation to impose this ban, it
to ratify the Basel Convention, which it
would be in a position
71
signed five years ago.'
The Clinton administration hopes the proposed ban will
prevent companies from circumventing strict U.S. environmental
standards by sending waste to nations with much weaker
Under the current United States regulatory
regulations. 17 2
system, U.S. agencies have no control over the export of waste
because companies need only the consent of the importing nation
to ship their hazardous waste. 173 The Clinton ban would block
the export of all hazardous waste to developing nations. 17 4 It
would also phase out shipments to OECD nations 175 over a fiveyear period to allow the recycling industry in the United States to
prepare for increased demand.17 6 Hazardous recyclable materials
would be temporarily exempted, but that exemption would
terminate after five years. 177 Safe recyclable wastes like paper,
plastics, and textiles, however, would be exempted entirely, as
would waste exports to Canada and Mexico. 178 Even with these
exemptions, the Clinton ban would still be one of the world's most
restrictive bans. 179
Reuter European Business Report, Mar. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
170. Id. See also Handley, Exports of Waste, supra note 25, at 10,061
(eighty-five percent of U.S. hazardous waste exports are to Canada).
The Basel Convention received the advice and consent of the United
171.
States Senate in 1992. However, the Convention cannot be officially ratified until
the United States enacts the appropriate legislation to meet the requirements of
the Basel Convention. Hazardous Waste, U.S. Exports to OECD for Recycling
Would Continue Under Svift-Synar Bil Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 42
d29, at A42 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Exports to OECD].
See Freedberg, supranote 26.
172.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. The OECD was organized to help coordinate the trade policies of its
member states: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Convention on the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 12
U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179. DOJHits Borden Chemicals with Charges of RCRA,
R ght-to-Know, AirAct Violations, Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 31, 1994).
See Allen, supranote 169. With a ban on hazardous waste exporting,
176.
waste generators will be forced to turn to the recycling industry as an alternative
method of disposal. Id.
177. The exemption applies to OECD member states. Id.
Id.
178.
Freedberg, supranote 26, at A4.
179.
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On March 7, 1994, U.S. Representatives Mike Synar (DOkla.) and Al Swift (D-Wa.) presented a bill, entitled the Waste
Export and Import Control Act of 1994, in the United States
House of Representatives as an alternative to the ban proposed by
the Clinton administration. 18 0 The Synar-Swift bill also would
have satisfied Basel Convention standards and allowed for the
official ratification of the Convention by the United States.18 1
However, the March 25 decision by the parties to the Basel
Convention to ban all hazardous waste exports from OECD
nations to non-OECD nations caused the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce to withdraw its support for ratification of the Basel
Convention, thereby eliminating any momentum that the SwiftSynar bill may have had to pass.1 8 2 United States industry forces
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce withdrew their support
because they viewed the March 25 decision as "contrary to ...
the goals of open world trade;" "the convention cannot be viewed
18 3
as the same document the United States originally signed."

The major challenge of the Basel Convention was to reconcile the
interests of developing nations, which wanted to limit or remove

180. The Waste Export and Import Control Act of 1994, H.R. 3965, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Synar-Swift Bill]. GreenpeaceClaims U.S. Auto
Batteries Source of Worker Lead Poisoning Overseas, Nat'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Mar.
11, 1994).
181. Exports to OECD, supra note 171, at A42.
182. 'Wait-and-See," supra note 108. The November 1994 general elections
in the United States have created more confusion over the United States policy on
hazardous waste exporting. Representative Mike Synar lost his seat in the U.S.
House of Representatives in the primary elections. US Failure to Ratfyp Basel
Treaty Seen As Environmental Justice Issue, Nat'l Envtl. Daffy (BNA) (Oct. 26,
1994). Representative Al Swift retired from his seat as chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous
Materials, which is responsible for ratifying the Basel Convention.
Id.
Furthermore, the Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Superfund,
Recycling, and Solid Waste Management-the Senate panel responsible for
ratifying the Basel Convention-received a new chairman when the Republican
Party gained a majority and took control of the Senate. Given the complicated
issues and the unresolved matters relating to the March 25 decision, any action
on the Basel Convention will be delayed until the new chairmen familiarize
themselves with the issues. Id.
183. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce thought that the goal of the Basel
Convention was to "address trade and environmental protection" at the same
time. The Chamber of Commerce believed that the United States annual $2.2
billion in commodities trading would be adversely affected by the March 25
decision because it would extend the Convention to recoverable scrap metals,
which are actively traded in the commodities market. Morgan E. Goodwin,
Chamber Reverses Basel Position;U.S. Chamber of Commerce no Longer Endorses
Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste Transportationand Disposal, AM. METAL
MARKET, June 1, 1994, at 9.
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the export market, with the interests of industrialized nations,
By
which wanted the export markets to remain viable.1 8 4
prohibiting the export of waste to non-OECD states, the March 25
decision has alienated industrialized nations, such as the United
States, that want the markets to remain open.
The proposed legislation regarding the Basel Convention
should contain incentives for United States industry to reduce its
generation of hazardous waste. Under the Clinton proposal,
industry is given five years to retrofit its equipment to prepare for
the complete ban proposed by the President. 185 The technology to
86
reduce the generation of hazardous waste is already available,'
but industry lacks the incentive to make this important and
expensive change. Two possible incentives f6r industries to install
the new technology are extending liability for hazardous waste
generators extraterritorially and providing tax breaks for

businesses that retrofit their plants.' 8 7 As politically unpalatable
as incentives might be, achieving the Basel Convention's goal of
reducing hazardous waste generation requires that any proposed
legislation contain incentives for United States industry to achieve

these reductions. 188

IV. THE PROBLEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM

A. Overview
The United States, one of the world's largest industrialized
nations, generates several hundred million metric tons of

Obstler, supranote 42, at 94.
184.
Allen, supranote 169.
185.
186. The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment reported in 1986 that the
United States could cut its hazardous waste generation in half in five years.
Unfortunately, the generation of hazardous waste has continued to grow steadily
at the rate of five percent a year. Fogel, supranote 20, at 19.
187. Peter Obstler argues that the extraterritorial application of CERCLA
liability would solve the problem of hazardous waste exporting. Obstler, supra
note 42, at 103; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (noting that
CERCLA liability does not extend extraterritorially). Using the same reasoning,
industries would reduce their hazardous waste generation if their exposure to
liability for improper disposal extended outside of the United States.
188. In order to achieve the reduction in hazardous waste generation called
for by the Basel Convention, U.S. industry, as the number one generator of
hazardous wastes in the world, wil have to install new technology to reduce the
hazardous waste. Legislation requiring such technology will be unpopular with

U.S. industries because it will require them to invest some of their resources in

environmental controls.
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hazardous waste each year.18 9 Yet in 1992, only around 145,000
tons were exported from the United States, less than one percent
of all the waste generated that year. 190 As a result, the United
States must find domestic sites for the disposal of over ninetynine percent of the waste generated each year. Hazardous waste
disposal sites have become increasingly scarce, however, as many
existing sites are filled to capacity or closed because of dangerous
storage practices. 191
Hazardous waste disposal sites near residential communities
are often deemed "locally undesirable land uses," or LULUs. 19
Such disposal sites are called LULUs because the costs of the
sites are borne locally, while the rest of society enjoys the
benefits.193 The people living closest to the sites often suffer
increased health problems, pollution and congestion, declining
property values, and community stigmatization. 19 4 Meanwhile,

society as a whole enjoys the benefit of the removal and disposal
of its hazardous waste.
The complaints of those
disproportionately affected by LULUs have become so common
that they are often referred to as the "not in my backyard," or
NIMBY, opposition. 19 s
Given current industry practices and
technology levels, however, the waste must be placed somewhere.

189. A conservative estimate of the amount of hazardous waste generated
by the United States annually is 238 million tons. Zuckoff, Waste Letter, supra
note 21.
190. Allen, supra note 169. According to Carol Browner, Administrator of
the EPA, "The U.S. exports only a fraction of a percent of our hazardous waste,
but that fraction adds up to a significant amount. The current policy puts people
in other countries at risk of dangerous exposures to toxic materials. That has to
stop." Id.
191.
See Handley, HazardousWaste Exports, supranote 22, at 10,172.
192. Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice
and the Siting of Locally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993).
193. Id. at 1001-02. Some commentators argue that local communities will
benefit from the siting of hazardous waste facilities nearby because of new jobs.
Increased employment opportunities in these situations are often illusory,
however. Westinghouse, which owns and operates a waste-to-steam facility in
Chester City, Pennsylvania, presented a similar argument in support of its waste
facility. A brief look at the 100 employees at the Westinghouse facility reveals
that only thirty-eight percent of the maintenance jobs and twenty percent of the
management jobs at the plant were held by residents of Chester City. The facility
has failed to make any real impact on the unemployment rate in Chester City.
Matthew P. Weinstock, Tired of Being Dumped On-Environmental Justice, 56
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS 4,48 (1994).
194. See MICHAEL R. EDELSIEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOXIC EXPOSURE 17-117 (1988).
195. Stephen C. Jones, Inequities of IndustrialSiting Addressed, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 20.
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The problem of environmental racism1 9 6 arises when
decisionmakers choose disposal sites based on factors other than
the equal distribution of the site's benefits and burdens. Often, a
location for a site is chosen solely on the basis of which
neighborhood is the least likely to present effective opposition to
its selection as a disposal site. 197 Empirical evidence suggests
that such neighborhoods typically are comprised largely of
minorities and the poor. 198 Thus, the cause of environmental
justice has been undertaken on behalf of those people historically
without political power.
B. The Warren County PCB Protests
The environmental justice movement first gained attention
throughout the United States in 1982 in Warren County, North

196. The Reverend Benjamin Chavis, who first coined this phrase in 1987
while Executive Director of the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial
Justice, defines environmental racism as "racial discrimination in policymaking,
the unequal enforcement of environmental regulations and laws, the deliberate
targeting of communities of people of color for toxic waste facilities and the official
sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons in minority communities."
HARRIS DEVILLE & ASSOCIA'ES, Catch Word or Catch22, 9 LA. IND. ENVTL. ADVISOR 6
(1994).
In April 1993 the Reverend Chavis, the most vocal proponent of the
environmental racism movement, was named Executive Director of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the oldest civil rights
organization in the United States. However, Chavis' tenure as Executive Director
was brief and much of his term at the NAACP was dominated by issues unrelated
to environmental racism. Amid controversy, the NAACP asked Reverend Chavis
to step down from his position on August 20, 1994. Reverend Chavis continues

to be an active participant in the environmental racism movement, however.
Marianne Lavelle, Greens and Companies Lose Leader; Did NAACP's Ben Chavis
Switch Sides, or Work to Bring Opponents Together?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 5, 1994, at
Al.
197. The following excerpt came from a report on the siting of incinerators
in the Los Angeles area:
Certain types of people are likely to participate in politics, either by
virtue of their issue awareness or their financial resources, or both.
Members of middle or higher-socioeconomic strata.., are more likely to
organize into effective groups to express their political interests and views.
All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major
facilities, but the middle and upper-socioeconomic strata possess better
resources to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher-socioeconomic
strata neighborhoods should not fall at least within the one mile and five
mile radii of the proposed site.
J. Stephen Powell, Cerrell Associates, PoliticalDifficulties Facing Waste to Energy
Conversion Plant Siting, Report to the California Waste Management Board 42-43

(1984).
198.

Been, supra note 192; at 1002-03.

280

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 28:251

Carolina.19 9 The state government of North Caroliha decided to

place a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)2 ° ° landfill in Warren
20 1

County, whose residents were predominantly poor and black.
The state planned to deposit over 6,000 truckloads of cancercausing, PCB-saturated soil in rural Warren County. 2 02 The
truckloads were to contain 40,000 cubic yards of soil tainted by
the illegal dumping of PCB-saturated oil on North Carolina
roadsides in the 1970s. 20 3
In an attempt to prevent the
placement of the hazardous waste site in Warren County, the
United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice helped
organize a nonviolent, civil disobedience rally. 2° 4 The Warren
County rally culminated in over 500 arrests 20 5 and is recognized
as the first national protest by African-Americans regarding the
siting of a hazardous waste landfill.2 0 6 Although the PCB landfill
was ultimately located in Warren County, the protests succeeded
in keeping other hazardous waste out of the area.2 0 7
The
Governor of North Carolina established a two-year moratorium on
the siting of hazardous waste landfills in North Carolina, and

199.
NMBY, supranote 2.
200.
Polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs, are oil-based chemicals used by
utilities as coolants in their transformers and other electrical equipment. In
1977, the EPA banned the manufacture and use of PCBs when it was determined
that PCBs may cause cancer. Jim Ritter, Edison Removes Most PCBs from
Neighborhoods,CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at 1I.
Recent studies conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of
Sciences have found that PCBs actually are much more hazardous to human
health than previously realized. Studies of fish caught in the PCB-contaminated
waters of Puget Sound found 1000 times as many alterations in the fish's DNA as

in the fish from clean water off the Oregon coast. Researchers believe that the
greater the damage to the DNA, the more likely the organism wil develop cancer.
Jane Kay, Stronger DNA Link to Cancer Uncovered; PCBs Can Inflict Serious
Damage, Study Finds, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 19, 1994, at Al.
201. THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISICS OF COMMUNITIES SURROUNDING HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES xi (1987) [hereinafter CRJ REPORT].
202.
Craig Fluomey, In the War for Justice, There's No Shortage of
EnvironmentalFights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 3, 1994, at 8J.
203. William Woltz, Citizens Push for Landfill Detoxification Legislation,
HERALD-SUN (Durham, NC), Nov. 19, 1994, at A1.
204. Id.
205.
CRJ REPORT, supranote 201.
206.
NIMB, supranote 2.
207.
Pamela Duncan, Environmental Racism: Recognition, Litigation, and
Alleviation, 6 TUL. ENV'TL.J. 317, 328 (1993).
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Warren County has not been targeted for future hazardous waste
2 08
disposal.
Perhaps more importantly, the demonstrations in Warren
County provided the impetus for the first U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) study of the racial and socio-economic composition20of9
communities surrounding hazardous waste disposal sites.
Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy (D-D.C.), one of 500 protesters
arrested in Warren County, and then-Congressman Jim Florio (DN.J.) called for the GAO to study the connection between racial
and economic characteristics and the location of hazardous waste
facilities in the South. 2 10 Although the GAO study only focused
on a small region in the South, it represented the first effort by
the United States government to address the issue of hazardous
waste landfill siting and the racial and socio-economic
21
demographics of the surrounding communities. '
C. The 1983 General Accounting Office Study
In 1983, as a result of political pressure from the Warren
County PCB Protests, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
commissioned a study of four hazardous waste landfills in the
southeastern United States to examine the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the residents in the surrounding
communities.2 12 The purpose of the regional study was to test
the contention of the growing environmental racism movement
that hazardous waste facilities were disproportionately located in
2 13
poor, African-American neighborhoods.
The GAO study examined the racial and socio-economic
characteristics of the communities surrounding four landfill sites
in Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region IV.2 1 4 In three

208. Jane Perkins, Recognizing and Attacking Environmental Racism, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 389, 391 (1992).
CRJ REPORT, supranote 201.
209.
Kenneth J. Hollenbeck & Stephen J. Hudik, Green Justice: Should the
210.
PoorInherit the Polluted?, N.J.L.J., June 6, 1994, at 10.
211.
Id.
212.
The four sites were Chemical Waste Management in Sumter County,
Alabama; Industrial Chemical Company in Chester County, South Carolina; SA
Services in Sumter County, South Carolina; and the Warren County PCB landfill
in Warren County, North Carolina. U.S. General Accounting Office, Siting of
Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status
of Surrounding Communities, GAO Pub. No. B-2111461, at 2 (1983) [hereinafter

Landfill Siting].
Id.
213.
214. The EPA has divided the United States into ten different regions.
Richard Severo, Method to Destroy Toxic PCB's is Tentatively Approved by U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1981, at A1S. The GAO study was limited to Region IV,
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of the four communities, African-Americans comprised between
fifty-two and ninety percent of the population, while AfricanAmericans only accounted for twelve percent of the total U.S.
population at that time.215 At the fourth landfill site, AfricanAmericans accounted for only thirty-eight percent of the
population within one mile of the site. 2 16 However, when the
radius of the study was expanded to include the population
within four miles of the site, the percentage of African-Americans
increased precipitously to between sixty-nine and ninety-two
percent of the population. 2 17 Thus, the GAO study clearly
established a link between race and the siting of landfills.
An examination of the economic characteristics of the
surrounding communities revealed that between twenty-six and
forty-two percent of the people residing near the four landfills
were living on incomes below the poverty line. 2 18 Because fewer
than sixteen percent of all U.S. citizens fall below the poverty line,
the study established a second link between income and the
siting of landfills. The 1983 GAO study supported Representative
Fauntroy's contention that hazardous waste landfills tend to be

located in communities with disproportionately large low-income,
African-American populations.
Although the statistics uncovered by the GAO study were
significant, commentators have claimed that the study was flawed
because it looked at only four landfill sites in Alabama, North
Carolina, and South Carolina.2 19 Commentators note that the
limited scope of the study precluded a showing of either a regional
or a national pattern of inequitable siting.2 20 However, the GAO
study was never intended to establish a national or regional
pattern of disproportionate siting.22 1 Rather, it was a response to

which covers the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
EPA: Agency Announces
Appointments of Two Regional Administrators, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No.

232 d32 (Dec. 6, 1993).
215.

Landfill Siting, supranote 212, at 4.

216.

Id.

217.
Id. at 3, app. 1.
218.
In 1993, the poverty line for a family of four in the United States was
$14,763. Approximately fifteen percent of all Americans had incomes below the
poverty line in 1993. Regarding Uruguay Round Implementing Legislation, 1994:
Hearings before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Fm1.
NEWS SERV., Oct. 14, 1994 (prepared statement of Thomas R. Donahue,

Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO).
219.
Duncan, supra note 207, at 328 n.40.
220.
Id.
221.
"[The GAO study] was not designed to examine the relationship
between the location of hazardous waste facilities throughoutthe United States and
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a call from the Warren County PCB protests to look for a link
between race, income, and the location of hazardous waste
landfills. Although the GAO study did not bring about major
changes in the selection of future landfill sites, the report
successfully raised the issue of the disproportionate placement of
hazardous waste sites and encouraged further study of the
22 2
issue.
D. The Commissionfor Racial JusticeReport
In 1987, the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial
Justice (CRJ or Commission) became the next organization to
study the relationship between race and the location of hazardous
waste sites. Aware of the flaws in the GAO study that limited its
utility, 223 the Commission sought to present "a comprehensive
national analysis of the relationship between hazardous wastes
and racial and ethnic communities."224 Armed with EPA data and
its own research, the Commission presented its report, Toxic
Wastes and Race in the United States.225 The report concluded
that race was the most significant factor in the location of
2 26
hazardous waste facilities.
The CRJ report analyzed both off-site commercial hazardous
waste facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste sites. 2 2 7 An off-site
commercial hazardous waste facility is any facility that accepts
hazardous waste from a third party for money, including landfills
and incinerators. 2 28
Uncontrolled toxic waste sites are
abandoned or closed sites that the EPA believes pose a health
threat, and may include closed and abandoned dumps,

the racial and socio-economic characteristics of persons residing near them."
CRJ REPORr, supranote 201, at 3 (emphasis added).
222.
Duncan, supranote 207, at 328 & n.40. "The GAO study was unique
as one of the only studies to date on the relationship between race and toxics...."
The GAO study was also the predecessor to the 1987 Commission for Racial
Justice Report. Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, in RACE
AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 12 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai

eds., 1992) [hereinafter Bryant & Mohai].
"Nor, prior to our current report, had there been a study to ascertain
223.
whether the GAO finding was indicative of any national patterns. This report

attempts to fill that void by presenting, for the first time, a comprehensive
national analysis of the relationship between hazardous wastes and racial and
ethnic communities." CRJ REPORT, supranote 201, at 3.
224.
Id.
225.
Id.

226.
227.
228.

Id. at xv.
Id. at 9.
Id. at xii.
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warehouses, and accidental spills. 22 9 The CRJ report examined
the racial and socio-economic composition of those communities
with off-site commercial hazardous waste sites and compared
them to communities without hazardous waste sites. 2 30 The
report concluded that "race was consistently a more prominent
factor in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities
than any other factor examined. "2 31 Minorities were five times
more likely to live in a community with an off-site commercial
hazardous waste facility than to live in a community without
23 2
one.
With respect to uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, the CRJ
report again found that race was the most significant factor in the
location of those sites. 2 3 Four times as many minorities lived in
communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites than in
communities without uncontrolled toxic sites. 2 - Moreover, three
out of every five African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans were
shown to have lived in a community with an uncontrolled toxic
waste site. 23 5
Therefore, not only are African-American
communities selected more often for commercial facilities, but
African-Americans also suffer a disparate impact from the
23 6
placement of uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
The CRJ report recognized several factors related to racial
composition that. were important in the siting decisions for
hazardous waste facilities. 23 7 Three factors acknowledged by the
Commission were: the surplus of inexpensive land in minority
communities; minorities' lack of political organization and
resources to oppose the facilities; and the immobility caused by
poverty and discrimination that prevents minorities from moving
away from hazardous waste facilities. 2 38
These factors, in

229. Id. at 3-4.
230. Been, supranote 192, at 1010.
231. CRJ REPORT, supranote 201, at 15.
232. Edward P. Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of
Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal

ProtectionAnalysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937, 969 (1993).
233. CRJ REPORT, supranote 201, at 18.
234.
235.

Boyle, supranote 232, at 968-69.
CRJ REPORT, supranote 201, at 13.

236.

Duncan, supranote 207, at 332.

237. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the
Evidence, in Bryant & Mohai, supranote 222, at 163.
238. Id. at 164. See also Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and
Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVT. L.J. 495, 506-18
(1992).
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2 39
addition to race, combine
known as
2 4°to create the phenomenon

"environmental racism."

E. The National Law Journal Report
After the Commission for Racial Justice released Toxic Wastes
and Race in the United States, a debate ensued as to whether the
placement of hazardous waste sites was strictly a race issue or an
economic one. 24 1 The 1983 GAO report had addressed both race
and income in its four limited situations, but the 1987 CRJ report
only looked at the racial composition of the communities
surrounding hazardous waste sites in the United States. Another
five years elapsed before a comprehensive report by the National
Law Journal (NLJ) examined both race and income as they relate
2 42
to hazardous waste disposal in the United States.

In 1992, the NLJ issued a report that analyzed the EPA's
record on nationwide enforcement of environmental laws.2 4 3 This

report was the first to focus on the role of the federal government
in the areas of race and the environment. 2 44 In a "Special
Investigation Issue," the NL.J reviewed every U.S. environmental
lawsuit over a seven-year period and concluded that fines levied
in white areas were significantly higher than those in minority
neighborhoods. 2 45 First, comparing hazardous waste sites with
the greatest surrounding white and minority populations, fines by
2 s
the EPA were 500 percent higher in the white neighborhoods. 4
Second, fines assessed under the federal air, water, and waste

pollution laws in white areas were found to be forty-six percent

higher than in minority neighborhoods. 2 4 7 Under every type of
U.S. environmental law, violations in minority neighborhoods
consistently incurred significantly lower average penalties than
violations in predominantly white areas. 24 8
Thus, minority

239.
Steven Keeva, A Breathof Justice, ABA J., Feb. 1994, at 91.
240.
Id. at 90.
241.
Duncan, supranote 207, at 334.
242.
See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection; The Racial
Divide in Environmental Law, NATL L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1.
243.
NIMBY, supranote 2, at 27-28.
244. John C. Chambers & Alyssa Senzel, Our Racist Environment;
DiscriminationLeaves Mark in Site Choices, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at S27.
245.
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 242, at S1 (in the N.J's "Special
Investigation" Issue).
246.
Id. Penalties in white areas averaged $335,565, while penalties in
minority areas averaged only $55,318. Id.
247.
Id.
248.
Duncan, supra note 207, at 336.
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communities are not receiving the same legal protection in the
24 9
form of civil and criminal sanctions as white communities.
After examining every toxic waste site in the twelve-year
history of CERCLA, 250 the NLJ report also determined that the
EPA takes more time and uses less effective methods to clean up
hazardous waste sites in minority communities than in largely
white communities.2 5 1 The study showed that the EPA takes
twenty percent longer to place on the National Priorities List (NPL)
abandoned hazardous waste sites in minority communities than
25 2
to do the same for abandoned sites in white neighborhoods.
Because of this delay, in more than half of the EPA regions across
the country, CERCLA clean ups in minority neighborhoods begin
twelve to forty-two percent later than they do in white
2
communities. 5
Moreover, once a CERCLA clean up begins, a disparity exists
in the methods employed by the EPA. 2 54 The EPA can use either

"containment" or "treatment" to deal with a hazardous waste
site.2 55 Treatment entails the removal or elimination of the
hazardous waste from the site, which is the preferred course of

249.

Because fines are used to deter future violations, Robert Bullard, a

legal scholar in environmental racism, argues that lower fines in minority
communities may actually drive hazardous waste disposers into minority
neighborhoods and allow violators to view these penalties as "a cost of doing
business." Lavelle & Coyle, supranote 242, at S2.

250. CERCLA, or Superfund, has recently been accused of being slow and
ineffective. Of the 1,292 "worst" hazardous waste sites on the Superfund National
Priorities List (NPL), which the EPA has identified over the last fourteen years,
only 237 of these sites (approximately eighteen percent) have been completely
cleaned up. Of these 237 cleaned up sites, only sixty have been permanently
removed from the NPL. Thus far, $10.8 billion of the Superfund has been spent
and estimates project that the NPL will grow to include between 2,100 to 10,000
sites, thereby increasing costs exponentially. John Shanahan, Superfund Status

Quo: Why the ReauthorizationBills Won't Fix Superfund's FatalFlaws, HERITAGE
FOUND. REP., No. 204, Oct. 3, 1994.
251. Lavelle & Coyle, supranote 242.
252. Id. Under CERCLA, the EPA ranks hazardous waste sites across the
nation and prioritizes them according to the level of threat they pose to human
health. Until a site is placed on the NPL, no action can be undertaken by the EPA
to clean up the location. Accordingly, the longer it takes for a hazardous waste
site to be placed on the NPL, the longer it takes for the site to be cleaned up
under CERCLA.

See ROGER W. FINDILEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

534-35 (3d ed. 1991).
253.
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 242.
254.
Id. The EPA has almost unfettered discretion with regard to which
cleanup method will be used. This determination is entirely fact-based and varies
from case to case. See generally CERCLA, supranote 49.
255. Lavelle & Coyle, supranote 242.

1995]

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM

action under CERCLA.25 6 Containment, on the other hand, only
strives to confine or cap the hazardous waste. 2 7 The NLJ report
discovered that in minority communities, the EPA chose
containment procedures more frequently than treatment
procedures, even though containment is the less preferred clean
up method under the statute.25 8
Conversely, in white
communities, the EPA chose treatment much more frequently
than containment. 25 9 Overall, the NLJ report showed a twentynine percent disparity in the clean up method relating to the
260
racial composition of the neighborhood.
Finally, the NLJ report concluded that race, not income,
influenced the sanction selected by the EPA under hazardous
waste laws. 26 1 Analyzing the correlation between average fines

and annual income, the report found that the average penalties
imposed by the EPA were actually three percent higher in the
neighborhoods with the lowest median income.2 62 While the NLJ
report concluded that income does affect siting, penalties, and
clean up methods, the report clearly demonstrates that race is the
more important factor in these decisions.2 63 As a result of the
report, the environmental justice movement gained momentum
and federal legislation was presented to deal with disproportionate
siting of hazardous waste facilities.
F. Current United States Policy
After years of inaction, the United States government has
begun to address environmental racism. On February 11, 1993,
President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12,898 on
Environmental Justice, which was drafted with the guidance of

256. Subsection 121(b) of CERCLA and the legislative history for the SARA
Amendments express a "preference' for 'permanent' solutions." (Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. 99-499, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986)). WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENrAL LAW 735-36 (2d ed. 1994).
257. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 242.
258. Id. Containment was chosen seven percent more frequently than
treatment in minority communities. Containment is a less preferable remedial
solution because the waste is not actually removed or neutralized, so it still poses
a potential threat to the surrounding community. Id.
259. Id. Treatment was chosen twenty-two percent more frequently than
containment when the EPA cleaned up sites in white neighborhoods. Id.
260. This disparity was calculated by adding the percentage differences
between the techniques used in white and minority communities.
261. Id.
262. Id. The report revealed that areas with the lowest median income had
average fines of $113,491, while neighborhoods with the highest median incomes
had average fines of $109,606. Id.
263. Duncan, supranote 207, at 337.
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the EPA.2 6
The Executive Order on Environmental Justice
requires all federal agencies to "make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations in the United
States."2 6 s To achieve this end, the Executive Order creates a
timetable by which each federal agency must create an
"environmental justice strategy" designed to rectify agency
programs or policies that cause a disproportionate impact on poor
2 66
and minority communities.
Specifically, the Executive Order creates an Interagency
Working Group on Environmental Justice, led by the EPA
Administrator. The Working Group is composed of the heads of
several key departments, including the Departments of Defense,
Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Justice, Interior, and Energy. 26 7 The goal of the
Working Group is to assist the federal agencies in developing their
"environmental justice strategies," to coordinate research and
data collection among the various departments, and to hold
public hearings to increase public access to the information
gathered by the agencies.2 68
These measures should prevent
future incidents of environmental racism.
In addition to the executive branch, 26 9 the legislative branch
has also reacted to the call for environmental equity. In the last

264.

Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).

265.

Id.§ 1-101.

266.

Id. § 103(a).

267.

Id. § 1-102(a). Federal agencies have six months from the date of the

Executive Order to submit an outline of their strategies and twelve months to
submit a final draft of their respective strategies to the Working Group. During
that twelve-month period, the agencies must also "identify several specific
projects that can be promptly undertaken to address particular concerns
identified during the development of the proposed environmental
strategy...." Id. §§ 1-103(a)-(e).

justice

268.

Id. § 1-102(b).

269.

Prior to the Executive Order on Environmental Justice, Carol Browner,

the administrator of the EPA, had already stated that environmental racism was
one of her top priorities. Stephen C. Jones, EPA Targets Environmental Racism,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 28. She promised to "weave environmental justice
concerns throughout all aspects of EPA policy and decision-making."
EPA
Administrator Carol M. Browner, Address at the District of Columbia Bar
Association Luncheon, National Press Club (June 25, 1993). There have also
been proposals to raise the EPA to a Cabinet position, increasing its importance
in the administration. In light of this trend, the Clinton Administration appears to
be actively involved in the environmental justice movement. Keeva, supra note
239, at 88.
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year, at least nine different bills were presented to Congress
addressing the issue of environmental racism. 270 The two most
significant bills were the Environmental Justice Act of 1993 and
The
the Department of Environmental Protection Act.
Environmental Justice Act of 1993271 proposed an in-depth
2 72
analysis to rank the nation's 100 most contaminated regions.
The bill then would provide technical assistance grants for groups
in those communities, require comprehensive health surveys,
mandate more detailed inspections of existing hazardous waste
facilities, and create a moratorium on new sources of pollution in
those areas. 2 73 This legislation would go a long way toward
protecting those communities already affected from further harm.
However, these measures would do little to protect presently
uncontaminated neighborhoods from environmental racism.
The second important bill, the Department of Environmental
Protection Act, was approved by the Senate on May 4, 1993.274 In
approving the Act, the Senate created the Office of Environmental
Justice. 2 75 The Office of Environmental Justice must identify
those regions subject to the greatest quantifies of hazardous
waste and designate those regions as "environmental high impact
areas" (EHIA).276 The Act also mandates further studies of the
race. 27 7
and
risk
environmental
between
correlation
Nevertheless, this Act suffers from the same reactive thinking that
limits the effectiveness of the Environmental Justice Act. Instead
of preventing future harm, the Department of Environmental
Protection Act focuses on redressing past injustices. Although it
is important to rectify those past harms, preventing future harms
is equally important. Without preventive measures aimed toward
all communities, not just those already contaminated, the
problem of environmental racism will not be remedied.

270. Rhona J. Kisch, PuttingEnvironmentalRacism on the NationalAgenda?,
24 ENVTL. L. 1171, 1182 n.51 (1994).
This Act was originally submitted in 1992 by then-Senator Albert Gore
271.
(D-Tenn.) and Representative John Lewis (D-Ga.). S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Jones, supra note 195, at 20
Congress did not pass the bill in 1992, and Representative Lewis
n.13.
reintroduced it in 1993. H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Chambers &
Senzel, supranote 244. Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.) has proposed the Senate
version of this bill. S. 1161, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
NIMBY, supranote 2, at 28.
272.
273. Id.
274. S. 171, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Jones, supra note 195, at 20.
275.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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Commentators also have offered a variety of measures to
alleviate the inequitable distribution of hazardous waste. These
solutions include re-working and re-applying constitutional equal
protection theory to remedy the problem;2 7 8 applying Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964279 to prevent the discriminatory siting
of landfills;2 8 0 and expanding the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)28 1 to ensure that future hazardous waste
facilities are located more equitably. 28 2
However, other
commentators contend that laws are ineffective tools for the task
at hand and that we must find other means to combat
2 83
environmental racism.

278. Boyle, supra note 232, at 938-40. As equal protection jurisprudence
now stands, a plaintiff must show a disparate impact from the government's
act-siting facilities only in minority neighborhoods-and a discriminatory intent
on the part of the government-intentionally locating the site in an AfricanAmerican neighborhood. Id. at 938. Because a plaintiff in an environmental
racism case probably will not be able to prove the second prong of the test, Mr.
Boyle suggest that equal protection analysis should be modified and expanded to
include environmental racism cases. Id. at 940.
279. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000(d) (1988).
280. Jones, supra note 195, at 20. Title VI gives environmental racism
plaintiffs the advantage of not requiring a showing of discriminatory intent, which
is required under Equal Protection analysis. Id. In March 1993, Dr. Clarice
Gaylord, the Director of the EPA's Office for Environmental Equity, may have
opened the door for Title VI claims by stating that there is no legal precedent nor
any EPA policy that would bar application of civil rights laws to the EPA. Id.
281. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988).
Prompted by the "Love Canal"
incident, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was enacted by
Congress in 1976 in response, to widespread concerns about the improper
disposal of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3254(f), 3256-3259 (1988).
Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying EnvironmentalRacism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394,
401 (1991). RCRA creates a system based on permits and documentation to
ensure that the enormous amount of hazardous waste generated each year in the
United States is properly disposed. See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 252, at
231-39.
282. Godsil, supra note 281, at 424. Presently, RCRA only requires states
to protect health and the environment. Id. Ms. Godsil suggests an amendment to
RCRA that would require a national policy of environmental equity and state
programs to ameliorate disproportionate siting. See id.
283. Luke W. Cole, Letter, Remedies for EnvironmentalRacism: A View from
the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1996-97 (1992).
Mr. Cole, a noted
environmental racism attorney and activist, suggests that U.S. laws will never
help the underrepresented poor and minority communities because they are only
designed to work for the politically potent. Id. at 1995-96. Mr. Cole suggests that
the solution to the problem of environmental racism is "grassroots activism," and
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The variety and disparity of possible solutions suggest that
no consensus exists on how to deal with the problem of
environmental racism. The important first step of raising the
issue publicly has already been accomplished. The government
must now move forward to effectuate a change. The government
must recognize that reactive measures will only prolong the
problem of environmental racism. As evidenced by the long delays
under the CERCLA framework, resolving hazardous waste
problems takes a very long time once they exist. Proactive steps
must be taken to ensure that the disproportionate siting that
The Clinton
occurred in the past does not continue.
Administration's Executive Order on Environmental Justice is a
step in the right direction, but enforcement of such an order will
be difficult without supporting legislation from Congress.
Congress, therefore, must enact proactive legislation if the
problem of environmental racism is to be remedied.

V. ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AS A
MICROCOSM OF HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTATION

The problem of environmental racism may be viewed as a
microcosm 28 4 of the problem of hazardous waste exporting.
Hazardous waste exporting is just environmental racism on a
The main similarity between the two is who
global scale.
shoulders the burden of living near and with the hazardous
waste. Under each regime, the poor are forced to shoulder a
disproportionate amount of national and global burdens. With
the notable exception of Canada, the targets of hazardous waste
exporting have been poor and developing nations, 285 primarily
because disposal in these developing nations is less expensive as
a result of less stringent, or non-existent, environmental
regulations. Strict environmental regulations and a shrinking
supply of landfill sites in the United States push the price of
domestic disposal so high that it is cheaper to dispose of the
waste in developing nations. As a result, the world's hazardous

resort to the U.S. legal system should become a secondary strategy. Id. at 199697.

284. A microcosm is defined as: "1: a little world: a miniature universe...;
2: man or human nature believed to be an epitome of the world or the universe...;
3: a community, institution, or other unity believed to be an epitome of a larger
unity." WEBSIER'S THIRD NEW INTERNAtiONAL DICTIONARY 1427 (1993) (emphasis

added).
285.

Porterfield & Weir, supranote 21, at 325.
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waste rushes toward poor, developing nations, "[l]ike water
-2 86
running downhill.
Domestically, studies have shown that poor communities in
the United States suffer a disproportionate share of the national
burden of hazardous waste. In a sense, the United States has
been "exporting" its hazardous waste to its poor neighborhoods,
just as industrialized nations have been exporting their waste to
the poor and developing nations in Africa and the Caribbean.
Minorities constitute a second group that shoulders a
disproportionate share of the pollution burden domestically and
internationally.
African nations were the original dumping
grounds for industrialized nations until they took affirmative
steps to ban hazardous waste imports in the Lome IV and
Bamako Conventions. 2 87
The Organization for African Unity
clearly viewed hazardous waste exporting as a racial issue when it
called the transport of waste into Africa "a crime against Africa
2 88
and African people."
In the United States, several studies have reported a
correlation between race and the location of hazardous waste

sites.

The GAO report in 1982 found that African-Americans

constituted from fifty-two to ninety percent of the population
surrounding three of the four landfills studied. 2 89
The
Commission for Racial Justice report in 1987 found that race was
the most significant factor in deciding the location of hazardous
waste facilities. 290 Furthermore, the National Law Journal report
in 1992 revealed that in minority neighborhoods, fines for
improper disposal were lower and the EPA was slower to clean up
the waste site. 29 1 Because the correlation between race and the
location of hazardous waste sites is supported by stronger
statistics than the correlation between income and the location of
hazardous waste sites, many commentators have ignored the
economic side of the problem. However, this conscious ignorance
would be a mistake in light of the memorandum leaked from the
World Bank, 2 9 which illustrates that income levels clearly have
an effect on the location of hazardous waste facilities.
The other similarity between hazardous waste exporting and
environmental racism is that both require the same remedies.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. (quoting then-Representative James Florio).
See Brooke, supranote 30.
Shabecoff, supra note 125.
Landfill Siting, supranote 212, at 4.
CRJ REPORT, supra note 201, at xv.
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 242, at Si.
See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
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The reduction of the overall generation of hazardous waste is
clearly the most effective remedy for hazardous waste exporting.
The preamble to the Basel Convention explicitly calls for a
worldwide reduction in the generation of hazardous waste, 29 3 and
later conventions build upon that premise. Similarly, the problem
of environmental racism would be significantly reduced if the
United States decreased its production of hazardous waste.

Fewer landfill sites would be required, and fewer communities
would be forced to live with hazardous waste in their
neighborhoods. Given that it is technologically feasible to reduce
waste generation in the United States by fifty percent over a
period of five years,2 94 the government must now supply the
necessary incentives to induce industry to make the change.
Indeed, the cost of these technological changes will be passed on
to the consumer. However, they are costs that we cannot
ethically avoid.
Reducing the amount of hazardous waste generated will not
solve all of these problems, however. In order to ensure the
equitable location of hazardous waste sites, generators must be
forced to dispose of their hazardous waste where it is generated, if
it is possible to do so in an environmentally sound manner. The
Bamako Convention imposes such a restriction on the movement
A similar legislative
of hazardous waste within Africa.2 95
restriction within the United States may reduce the exposure of
poor and minority communities to off-site commercial hazardous
waste disposal facilities. Restricted interstate movement will not
prevent exposure to the generating facilities themselves, but the
reduced transportation will limit exposure to accidental spills and
landfills.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hazardous waste exporting constitutes environmental racism
on a global scale. The only difference between the two problems
is the final destination of the hazardous waste. Both hazardous
a
racism
place
exporting and
environmental
waste
and
both
the
poor
and
minorities,
disproportionate burden on
have similar remedies. The combined effect of the reduction in
the generation of hazardous waste with the disposal of wastes

293.
294.
295.

Basel Convention, supranote 69, at 675.
Fogel, supranote 20, at 19.
Shearer, supranote 18, at 153.
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where they are generated will significanfly alleviate, if not solve,
both problems.
The recognition that environmental racism is the national
embodiment of the global problem of hazardous waste exporting is
crucial to the solution of both problems. In each situation, people
are exploited because they are politically powerless. However,
once they recognize the similarity of their causes, parties from

both movements will be able to join together to capture more
political power. Together, both movements will be able to end the
disparity in the location of hazardous wastes in poor and minority
2 96
communities.
Hugh J. Marbury

296.

See id. at 183.

